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Introduction
Antitrust is a less than wholly clear body of substantive law, as judges
with highly diverse philosophies, prejudices, and economic preferences
have gradually formed the rules over the course of a century.1 The
resulting legal ambiguity thus leaves antitrust prosecutors with a range
of choices, and invites the thoughtful prosecutor to issue guidelines
advising potential defendants about what actions the enforcement
agency will or will not pursue in enforcing the law.2 Any prosecutor
issuing guidelines is likely to let his or her own sense of priorities, stan-
dards, and proper policy creep into the guidance process. Yet attorneys
can use the guidelines as a counseling tool to the extent that (a) the
prosecutor has a de facto monopoly on prosecution decisions, and (b)
attorneys can apply the criteria to particular factual situations with rela-
tive ease. Alas, neither is true with respect to the 1988 International
Guidelines.
* Partner, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, Washington, D.C.; A.B. Princeton;
B.A. Cambridge; LL.B. Harvard. Assistant Attorney General in Charge of the
Antitrust Division, United States Department ofJustice, 1976-77. Professor of Law,
Cornell Law School, 1975-78.
** Associate, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, Washington, D.C.; A.B. Princeton;
J.D. Yale.
1. See R. BORK, THE ANTrrRUST PARADOx 15-49, 164-74, 201-18, 234-37, 246-60,
280-91, 299-309, 330-46, 349-55 (1978); L. SuLivAN, ANTrrRUsT 165-86, 213-24,
232-38, 268-73, 472-79, 579-87, 590-91, 593-96 (1977); P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
ANTrrRUST LAw 529-36, 602-13 (1978).
2. "Uncertainty in the law is compounded by uncertainty about prosecutors and
prosecutorial discretion. Even the clearest of laws becomes uncertain in its ultimate
impact if it is unevenly enforced." Address by D.I. Baker, "Antitrust in the Sun-
shine," before the New York State Bar Association, Antitrust Law Section (January
26, 1977) (announcing release of the 1977 Department ofJustice Antitrust Guide for
International Operations [hereinafter 1977 Guide]).
23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 405 (1990)
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The 1988 Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines
for International Operations ("1988 Guidelines") 3 read more like a
preacher's sermon than a counselor's guide. The Antitrust Division
(hereinafter "Division") of the U.S. Department ofJustice does not pur-
port to tell the reader in the 1988 Guidelines what constitutes the law in
this difficult area, but rather what it thinks the law ought to be. Since the
Division adopts positions in the 1988 Guidelines that are often less
stringent than in case law,4 its normative pronouncements cannot offer
any client a safe harbor from an enraged private plaintiff, the Federal
Trade Commission, or a state attorney general.
The 1988 Guidelines are meant to reach the courts, Congress, the
antitrust intelligentsia, and perhaps foreign governments. The 1988
Guidelines seem to be an appeal to an influential yet diverse audience.
Stated another way, the 1988 Guidelines constitute an omnibus amicus
brief to any jurist, politician, or philosopher-king who will listen.5
The 1988 Guidelines offer a substantial body of intellectual ammu-
nition for use in private litigation, as well as in litigation brought by state
and federal antitrust enforcement agencies. Because the document
bears the seal of the U.S. Department of Justice,6 the 1988 Guidelines
should carry more weight than an amicus brief by a less august party.
Therefore, the Division is also addressing antitrust litigators and their
clients.
In addition, the antitrust courtiers who specialize in dealing with the
federal antitrust enforcers on questions of law, fact, economic policy,
and prosecutorial discretion will find the 1988 Guidelines useful. Such
attorneys can use the 1988 Guidelines to persuade the Division (and
perhaps even the Federal Trade Commission) to refrain from damaging
their clients. 7
Finally, the 1988 Guidelines have some general political utility in an
area of great diplomatic sensitivity and market uncertainty. They can
exert influence where dangerous potential exists for conflict with impor-
tant U.S. trading partners. The risk of U.S. antitrust law deterring effi-
ciency-promoting investments and efforts by domestic and foreign firms
is high. A wordy but generally soothing restatement of federal enforce-
ment policy may make a positive contribution in such circumstances.
3. Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations [hereinafter
1988 Guidelines], 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,109.10, at 20,589 (1989), reprinted
in 55 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1391 (Nov. 17, 1988) (Special Supp.).
4. See generally Fugate, The New Justice Department Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for
International Operations-A Reflection of Reagan and, Perhaps, Bush Administration Antitrust
Policy, 29 VA. J. IN'L L. 295 (1989) (reviewing 1988 Guidelines in light of case law).
5. See, e.g., 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, pt. I, No. 5, 13,109.10, at 20,612
n.167 ("In the Justice Department's view, antitrust suits prosecuted by the U.S. Gov-
ernment should not be subject to dismissal by U.S. courts on the basis of comity.").
6. 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, 13,109.10, at 20,589.
7. Such use rests on the assumption that the agency itself will generally seek to
follow its own guidelines in exercising its discretion, even if the position stated in its
guidelines is not supported by (or is inconsistent with) decided case law. See Baker,
Critique of the Antitrust Guide: A Reoinder, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 255, 257 (1977).
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I. The Role of Guidelines in Antitrust Enforcement
The guideline tradition in antitrust began during Professor Donald Tur-
ner's reign as Assistant Attorney General in Charge of the Antitrust
Division (1965-1968). During this period, the Government won a series
of ever-less-plausible merger cases in the populist climate of the Warren
Supreme Court.8 This line of cases led an exasperated Justice Stewart
to exclaim in his dissent in United States v. Von's Grocery that, "[t]he sole
consistency... is that in litigation under § 7, the Government always
wins." 9 This situation caused substantial dissent and uncertainty in the
business and investment banking communities, as well as in the antitrust
bar. Since the cases always went one way, the key variable in merger
analysis became whether the Government would choose to sue. Profes-
sor Turner and his colleagues responded to the problem with almost
two years of hard work that produced the 1968 Merger Guidelines
(" 1968 Guidelines"). 10 The 1968 Guidelines were very brief and relied
almost exclusively on market share and other structural data. For the
most part, the Division simply indicated which mergers the Government
would "ordinarily challenge" based on market share. In accordance
with the decided case law of the day,"I it set fairly low thresholds for
bringing cases. 12 At the same time, however, the 1968 Guidelines did
not address the most extreme of the government's victories (including
Brown Shoe13 in the vertical area and Von's Grocery14 in the horizontal
area). Nevertheless, the Division intended the 1968 Guidelines to
reflect generally the existing law and explained its purpose as such at the
time of issuance.
The next exercise in "guidelinesmanship" by the Division resulted
in the 1977 Antitrust Guide for International Operations ("1977
Guide"), 15 which introduced the "hypothetical case" type of guidance
also found in the 1988 Guidelines. The 1977 Guide opened with a very
8. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America (Rome Cable), 377 U.S. 271 (1964); United States v.
Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S.
546 (1966).
9. 384 U.S. at 301.
10. The 1968 Merger Guidelines [hereinafter 1968 Guidelines], 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 13,101, at 20,521 (1988). As an assistant section chief in the Antitrust
Division, D. I. Baker helped prepare the 1968 Guidelines.
11. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTrTRUST LAw 909a (1980).
12. 1968 Guidelines, supra note 10, at 20,523, 20,525. For example, in markets
with four-firm concentration ratios of less than 75%, the Department stated that it
would ordinarily challenge mergers in which the acquiring and acquired firm each
had a market share of 5%.
13. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
14. United States v. Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. 220 (1966).
15. The 1977 Antitrust Guide for International Operations [hereinafter 1977
Guide], 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,110, at 20,643 (1989), reprinted in Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 799, at E-1 (Feb. 1, 1977). D. I. Baker helped prepare
the 1977 Guide while on the Cornell Law School faculty. OnJanuary 26, 1977, after
Baker became Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Division, the Division
issued the Guide.
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brief expository statement (8 1/2 typescript pages), followed by 14 case
examples (covering 54 typescript pages). The Division, faced with gen-
eral concern in the U.S. business community that antitrust rules were
limiting the competitiveness of American firms, decided that case exam-
ples would best deal with this concern.
The Division repeated this exercise three years later in issuing the
Antitrust Guide Concerning Research Joint Ventures (" 1980 Guide"). 16
The Division issued the 1980 Guide in response to political concern that
antitrust was unduly discouraging collective research efforts.' 7 Again in
"case example" form, but somewhat longer than the 1977 Guide, the
1980 Guide covered a variety of research issues. It also republished a
case example from the 1977 Guide concerning a joint research ven-
ture.18 The 1980 Guide became part of an ongoing political dialogue
which led to the passage of the National Cooperative Research Act in
1984.19
In 1982, Professor William Baxter, as Assistant Attorney General,
issued the 1982 Merger Guidelines ("1982 Guidelines") which departed
radically from past guidelines.20 The Division produced the 1982
Guidelines in an expository form and included many sections and sub-
sections addressing important issues in detail and with analytical preci-
sion. About twice as long as the 1968 Guidelines, the 1982 Guidelines
served as an intellectual tour deforce and introduced new concepts such
as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI"),21 now routinely used by
antitrust practitioners. The 1982 Guidelines presented standards for
challenging mergers which were less stringent than decided case law22
and widely accepted as a very useful tool.23
The Division updated the 1982 Guidelines in 1984, primarily to
give greater weight to international competition as a factor in merger
16. The Antitrust Guide Concerning Research Joint Ventures [hereinafter 1980
Guide], 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,120, at 20,651 (1988). The Division released
the 1980 Guide in November 1980.
17. Id.
18. Id, Case D, at 20,674-76.
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (Supp. 11 1989).
20. The 1982 Merger Guidelines [hereinafter 1982 Guidelines], 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 13,102, at 20,521 (1988). The Division announced the 1982 Guide on
June 14, 1982.
21. Id. at 20,536. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI") measures market
concentration. The HHI of a market equals the sum of the squares of the individual
market shares of the firms in the market. For example, a market consisting of one
firm with a 30% share, one firm with a 20% share, and five firms each with 10%
shares has an HHI of 1800 ((30 x 30) + (20 x 20) + 5(10 x 10) = 1800). The
highest possible HHI (10,000) corresponds to a market consisting of a single monop-
olistic firm. By contrast, an unconcentrated market consisting of 50 firms of equal
size (2% shares) has an HHI of 200 (50 x (2 x 2) = 200).
22. See Baker & Blumenthal, The 1982 Guidelines and Preeaisting Law, 71 CALIF. L.
REV. 311 (1983).
23. For a review of the literature on the relative merits of the HHI compared to
alternative measures of concentration, see W. BLUMENTHAL, A.B.A. ANmITRusT SEC-
TION, MONOGRAPH No. 12, HoRIzoNTAL MERGERS: LAw AND POLICY 178-82 (1986).
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analysis and to introduce efficiency as an explicit defense.2 4 The Divi-
sion followed the 1982 format, but the standards seemed generally to be
even a little less stringent than their predecessors. 2 5 The, Division and
the Federal Trade Commission have continued to use the 1984 Guide-
lines to analyze particular cases. 2 6 Courts, too, have found the updated
merger guidelines useful. In 1987, the state attorneys general issued a
set of counter-guidelines, covering horizontal mergers only, in the same
general format as the 1984 Merger Guidelines. 27
The Division's next entry in the guideline derby simply failed in
practical terms. In 1985, the Division issued its Vertical Restraints
Guidelines. 28 These brought many complex and unfamiliar abstractions
to a heavily litigated legal area in which the Antitrust Division had not
actively participated for at least two decades. 2 9 The Division's statement
of its enforcement policy constituted, therefore, a transparent fiction.
The Division offered, in effect, a long amicus brief generally supporting
those who wished to impose, inter alia, territorial restraints, tie-ins, and
restrictive licenses. Sparking an acute political controversy,30 the guide-
lines simply strayed too far from existing law for counselors to use them.
Moreover, they attracted strong political opposition from populist
voices in antitrust, including Congress and the state attorneys general.
Congress passed a joint resolution urging withdrawal of the Vertical
Restraints Guidelines,3 1 while the state attorneys general issued
24. The 1984 Merger Guidelines [hereinafter 1984 Guidelines], 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 13,103, at 20,551 (1988). See Baker & Blumenthal, The Revised Merger
Guidelines: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, Nat'l LJ., July 9, 1984, at 39.
25. For example, the 1984 Guidelines took a more favorable view of claimed effi-
ciendes from mergers than did the 1982 Guidelines. 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,103, at 20,554 (1988).
26. See, e.g., 60 Minutes with Daniel Oliver, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, 58
ANmITUsT L.J. 355, 365-67 (1989).
27. Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the National Association of Attorneys Gen-
eral (NAAG), 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,405, at 21,181 (1988). NAAG adopted
the Guidelines unanimously on March 10, 1987.
28. 50 Fed. Reg. 6263 (Feb. 14, 1985), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,105, 20,575 (1988). See Baker, New Vertical Restraints Guidelines: Justice's Effort to
Influence Courts, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 4, 1985, at 22.
29. Following its much criticized victory in United States v. Arnold Schwinn &
Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (overruled in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977)), the Division stopped allocating significant resources to vertical
investigations. The Division brought occasional cases; the most noted (and criti-
cized) was In re Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, Inc., 665 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068 (1983), in which the Division sought criminal indict-
ments for vertical price-fixing.
30. The Government's amicus brief in Monsanto v. Spray-Rite, 465 U.S. 752
(1984), urged the Supreme Court to reverse the long-standing per se prohibition
against vertical price-fixing. An angry Congress responded with a rider to the
Department appropriation prohibiting the expenditure of any finds so as to urge
repeal oftheperse rule. Pub. L. No. 98-166, § 510, 97 Stat. 1071, 1102 (1983). This
rider appears to have fenced in the Government in its preparation of the 1988
Guidelines.
31. Pub. L. No. 99-180, § 605, 99 Stat. 1169 (1985).
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counter-guidelines in this area.32
11. The 1988 International Guidelines
The 1988 Guidelines combine the two prior formats and begin with a
lengthy exposition of theory (105 typescript pages), organized in a for-
mat very similar to the 1982 Guidelines and 1984 Merger Guidelines.
The Division places different subjects in discrete pigeonholes with
appropriately complex numbers.33 In addition, the 1988 Guidelines
include an even longer discussion of eighteen cases (121 typescript
pages). The format for the cases is generally similar to that used in the
1977 Guide and the 1980 Guide, although the case explanations are
longer than in the earlier guides.
The 1988 Guidelines both differ from and parallel the 1977
Guide.3 4 The 1988 Guidelines extensively discuss the principles under-
lying action by the Division, and also reveal the difficulty in quantifying
and predicting variables crucial to guided decisions.
A. Special Factors Relating to the International Guidelines
International antitrust cuts across the interests of various sovereigns
which will often support cartels favoring their producers, while perhaps
opposing other cartels which injure their consumers.35 Within the
American system, the federal government could opt for competition as a
preemptive national policy and override local cartels, even government-
supported cartels, under the Supremacy Clause.3 6 In the international
arena, the Supremacy Clause has no force and, therefore, automatic res-
olution of conflicts does not exist either. Instead, various legal doc-
trines, such as "sovereign immunity," T37  "foreign government
32. 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,400, at 21,151 (1989). NAAG adopted the
Vertical Restraints Guidelines on December 4, 1985, and amended them on Decem-
ber 7, 1988.
33. See infra Appendix A: Plain English Summary of International Guidelines,
which uses official titles and numbering.
34. See infra Appendix B, which compares the cases in the 1988 Guidelines to
those in the 1977 Guide.
35. Baker, The Proper Role for Antitrust in a Not-Yet-Global Economy, 9 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1135 (March 1988).
36. The American system has not done this. The Supreme Court's most recent
pronouncements in the domestic context allow an enormous (and undesirable) range
for local cartelization under the aegis of the "state action" doctrine. See Southern
Motor Carriers Rate Conf. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985); Patrick v. Burget,
108 S.Ct. 1658 (1988). So long as there exists clearly articulated state policy in favor
of cartelization and active public supervision of the cartel, such activity remains
exempt.
37. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682,
698-705 (1976) (White, J., plurality opinion); Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA), Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 1891 (1976); see generally A.B.A. AN-nTrUST SEC-
TION, ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS (hereinafter ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS]
560-62 (2d ed. 1984).
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compulsion,"38 "act of state,"3 9 and "comity," 40 seek to determine
when the policy and jurisdiction of one sovereign succumb to those of
another. In addition, in cases in which the United States government is
a party to litigation, a foreign sovereign will feel free to use diplomatic
negotiations as a way to persuade the government to exercise
prosecutorial discretion and to refrain from doing what it has clear juris-
diction to do.41
Thus, international antitrust enforcement has three important char-
acteristics. First, the American business community does not want U.S.
antitrust enforcement (particularly enforcement against mergers, joint
ventures, and restrictive licenses) to handicap firms facing global com-
petition. Second, foreign governments do not want the exercise of U.S.
antitrustjurisdiction based on the "effects doctrine"42 to constitutejudi-
cial imperialism and to interfere with their internal affairs. 43 Finally, for-
eign enterprises and their governments do not want U.S. antitrust
enforcement either to constitute a thinly-veneered non-tariff barrier to
foreign investment in the United States (usually by merger or joint ven-
ture) or to interfere with a foreign government's particular domestic
policy intended to foster the interests of its own producers.
B. Comparing International Guidelines
The Division issued the 1988 Guidelines and its 1977 predecessor for
different reasons; therefore, not surprisingly, the two differ substantially
in tone and style, as well as in substantive policy.
1. The 1977 Guide
As noted, the Division issued the 1977 Guide to allay the recurrent busi-
ness concern that antitrust rules unnecessarily restricted the interna-
38. See, e.g., Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, 307 F. Supp.
1291, 1296-98 (D. Del. 1970); see generally ANTITUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note
37, at 566-68.
39. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., 425 U.S. 682; Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); see generally ANTIRrusT LAw DEVELOPMENTS,
supra note 37, at 562-66.
40. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976), 749 F.2d 1378, 1382-86 (9th Cir. 1984).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 731 F. Supp. 3, 6 n5 (D.D.C.
1990) (diplomatic note from Finnish Embassy opposing blocking of merger). In
November 1984, President Reagan ordered the Justice Department to close its grand
jury investigation of suspected anticompetitive conduct by international airlines
offering transatlantic service. The President's decision reportedly followed "exten-
sive consultations" between the American and British governments. 47 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1192 (Nov 29, 1984).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d. 416, 443 (2d
Cir. 1945) (L. Hand,J.) ("[I]t is settled in law... that any state may impose liabilities,
even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has
consequences within its borders which the state reprehends .... )
43. Baker, U.K. Using New Weapons to Attack Foreign Reach of U.S. Trust Laws, Nat'l
L.J., Jan. 14, 1980, at 24.
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tional flow of U.S. capital and exports.4 Many in the Division believed
that this concern was largely ungrounded, and that, to the extent that
antitrust concerns constrained the business community, overly cautious
legal advice created an obscure area of law.45 Accordingly, the Division
invited a presidentially-appointed council on exports to submit exam-
ples and problems, and the Division offered to provide written explana-
tions of the antitrust rules applicable to such situations. Two years later
the Division issued the 1977 Guide. Upon its release, the Assistant
Attorney General cautioned:
Of course, no Guide can make the hard cases easy: such cases will surely
turn on slight variations of fact and policyjudgments. What the Division
hopes this Guide will do is to make dearer what we think the really hard
cases are.
Our cases are not precious or highly technical: we act where we can find
evidence and see positive benefit to the American public as consumers
and exporters. If this is our policy we ought to state it - and this is what
we have tried to do in the International Guide.46
The Division intended the 1977 Guide to simplify, clarify, and
"examine in a coherent way an area of the law that has been character-
ized by much mechanistic lawyering and academic quibbling.... It is a
very deliberate attempt to make the subject less arcane, less technical,
and less mysterious, and to inject a broader view into the field."'47 The
Division targeted the 1977 Guide as much to in-house counsel across
the country as to antitrust specialists in major cities.
The Division stated the goals of the 1977 Guide in terms of the
Division's enforcement policy, but actually intended it to serve as a legal
document based on decided case law. Thus, not surprisingly, the 1977
Guide contained many more references to decided cases than the 1988
Guidelines. The Division did this because it believed that the threat of
overly cautious, private counseling and overly aggressive, private dam-
age litigation posed real risks to efficient business planning.48 In order
to persuade counselors to use the 1977 Guide as a counseling tool, the
Division had to offer something more than a policy statement. The Divi-
sion had to ground the 1977 Guide in law to enable the 1977 Guide to
serve as an amicus brief in support of some reasonable restraint.
44. 1977 Guide, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
45. In the Introduction to the 1977 Guide, the Division noted that uncertainty as
to antitrust enforcement issues "may sometimes cause businesses to abandon or limit
unobjectionable transactions, or to embark upon unnecessarily restrictive transac-
tions which would not be undertaken if the antitrust risk were more clearly per-
ceived." 1977 Guide, supra note 15, Introduction. See also Baker, supra note 7, at 255-
57, 259-60.
46. D.I. Baker, supra note 2.
47. Baker, supra note 7, at 255.
48. The Division saw the Federal Trade Commission as a potential risk in the
international area, but not to the same degree as private plaintiffs.
Pol. 23
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In at least two areas, however, the 1977 Guide departed from the
state-of-the-law in 1977. The first was with regard to jurisdiction, a
highly debated subject among international lawyers and a source of con-
cern to foreign governments as well as to U.S. and foreign businesses
because the Division had used the U.S. antitrust laws so extensively over
the years to reach overseas restraints. The 1977 Guide stated that the
Department would not "apply the Sherman Act to a combination of
United States firms for foreign activities which have no direct or
intended effect on United States consumers or export opportunities. '49
Elsewhere, the 1977 Guide used the slightly different phrase, "a sub-
stantial and foreseeable effect." 50 Essentially, the drafters of the 1977
Guide wanted to leave the protection of foreign consumers to foreign
governments. This position (which was criticized initially)51 received
support from policymakers on Capitol Hill; the export trading company
legislation in 1982 amended the Sherman Act and the FTC Act to
require "a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable" impact on (a)
the U.S. internal market and imports into that market, or (b) the export
opportunities of U.S. firms.52
The second area in which the Division staked out a clear position
amid much confusion involved the application of the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine overseas. 58 The Division took the position that the doctrine
protected lobbying "efforts to cause a foreign government to impose
restraints on U.S. commerce."'  The Division based its position on the
premise, articulated in Noerr, that U.S. antitrust law was not intended to
reach government-imposed restraints or efforts to procure them.55
Thus, the issue was broader than just the question of whether the First
Amendment applied to petitions addressed to foreign governments.
Over twelve years later, the Supreme Court has yet to resolve the
issue.15 6
2. Usefulness of the 1988 Guidelines
The 1988 Guidelines are more ambitious than the 1977 Guide in the
positions articulated and more limited in the targeted audience. In
other words, the Division does not intend the 1988 Guidelines to func-
49. 1977 Guide, supra note 15, 13,110, at 20,646.
50. Id. at 20,645.
51. See Griffin, A Critique of the Justice Departments Guide for International Operations,
11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 215, 224-27 (1977).
52. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit.
IV §§ 401-403, 96 Stat. 1246 (1982) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 note 6a, 45).
53. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961);
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). This doctrine establishes
that the antitrust laws do not apply to concerted action designed to influence the
government and thereby procure favorable treatment. See ANTrTrusr LAw DEVELOP-
MENTS, supra note 37, at 613-19.
54. 1977 Guide, supra note 15, Case N, 13,110, at 20,649-17.
55. 365 U.S. at 135-38.
56. See ANTRnusT LAw DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 37, at 569-70 (2d ed. 1984 & 2d
Supp. 1983-1988).
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tion as a quick and readily accessible tool for in-house counsel seeking
to give on-the-run antitrust advice concerning some immediate situa-
tion. They neither purport to represent an application of established
law,5 7 nor pose the risk of chilling the enthusiasm of plaintiffs more dan-
gerous to business than the Division. The Division addressed the scope
of the guidelines:
These Guidelines are intended to provide businesses engaged in interna-
tional operations with practical guidance concerning the Department's
internal antitrust enforcement policies and procedures.
Readers should separately evaluate the risk of private litigation by competi-
tors, consumers, and suppliers, as well as the risk of enforcement by state
prosecutors under state and federal antitrust laws. 58
Counselors should find the 1988 Guidelines most useful in those
few areas in which the Division presents a tougher position than the
decided case law. Foreign sovereign compulsion represents the most
obvious example.5 9 The Division requires legal compulsion of some
form as a defense, 60 in contrast to the domestic rule under Southern
Motor Carriers that exempts conduct carried out pursuant to a clearly
articulated policy and subject to active government supervision. 6 1 This
aggressive position may place either counsel or client in a politically dif-
ficult situation with a foreign government, but all parties benefit from
advance warning of the Division's position.
The difficulty involved with calculation of certain market data may
cause the 1988 Guidelines to be less useful to counselors. The 1988
Guidelines rely heavily on an initial market power screen in applying the
rule of reason. This methodology introduces the complex market defi-
nition issue at a time when the counselor may not yet have enough facts
on demand and supply elasticities to make a confident prediction as to
what constitutes the market. Therefore, caution requires the counselor
to assume a narrow market (producing high market shares), and then to
proceed to considerations of market conditions, entry, and efficiencies,
including less anticompetitive alternatives to the proposed transac-
tion.62 Counselors may find many (and sometimes all) of these factors
hard to predict and quantify. Thus, the level of counseling comfort in
advance of a deal, venture, or action may not greatly increase.
The antitrust specialist or litigator with a foreign antitrust case may
find the 1988 Guidelines more useful. The Division seems candid in
explaining how it looks at matters and makes decisions. Its stated posi-
tions should act as a catalyst for further thought and perhaps legislative
57. 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, pt. I, 3.0 n.43, 13,109.10, at 20,589-3,
20,593.
58. Id., 13,109.10, at 20,589-3 (emphasis added).
59. 1988 Guidelines, supra note 5, pt. I, No. 6, 13,109.10, at 20,613-14.
60. Id.
61. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 57 (1985).
62. 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, pt. 3.3, 13,109.10, at 20,598-99.
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action, as did the 1977 Guide and the 1980 Guide. The utility is not
limited to international cases; in a number of areas (e.g., mergers) the
Division states positions that differ, albeit slightly, from its past guide-
lines and these positions apply domestically as well.63 The length and
detail of the 1988 Guidelines, which make them less useful for counsel-
ors rendering on-the-spot legal advice, are less problematic to the spe-
cialists and the litigators who commonly handle bulky documents and
have time to do so.
3. What Messages Do the Guidelines Send?
In addition to identifying safe harbors for mergers, joint ventures, and
intellectual property licensing arrangements, the 1988 Guidelines com-
municate the Division's generally favorable view of territorial restric-
tions, its generally suspicious view of trade law proceedings, its
unwillingness to apply the state action doctrine to foreign governments,
and its refusal (at least in 1988) to accept U.S. exporters as intended
beneficiaries of the antitrust laws.
a. Safe Harbors for Mergers
The 1988 Guidelines add new safe harbors to the one offered by the
1984 Merger Guidelines while eliminating certain danger zones that the
1984 Merger Guidelines declared presumptively challengeable. The
only safe harbor in the 1984 Merger Guidelines was for mergers that left
markets unconcentrated (post-merger HHI's less than 1000).6 4 The
1988 Guidelines create two new safe harbors: one for certain mergers
that result in moderate concentration (post-merger HHI's between 1000
and 1800), and one for certain mergers that result in high concentration
(post-merger HHI's over 1800).65
For mergers resulting in moderate concentration, the 1988 Guide-
lines establish an increase in the HHI of 100 points as the upper limit of
a new safe harbor.6 6 Under the 1984 Merger Guidelines, an increase in
the HHI of 100 points for a merger resulting in moderate concentration
constituted a threshold above which the Division would likely challenge
the merger, unless factors other than market share and market concen-
tration led the Division to conclude that the merger would "not likely
substantially... lessen competition."' 67 The 1988 Guidelines, by con-
trast, omit any mention of a presumptive threshold of illegality for merg-
ers resulting in moderate concentration.
Likewise, for mergers resulting in high concentration, the 1988
Guidelines convert an increase in the HHI of fifty points into a safe har-
bor boundary below which the Division will not raise a challenge. Under
the former guidelines, an increase of fifty points constituted a threshold
63. See infra, Appendix B, pt. 1.
64. 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 24, 13,103, at 20,552-553.
65. 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, pt. I, No. 3.32, 13,109.10, at 20,598.
66. Id
67. 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 24, 13,103, at 20,552.
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point at which government challenge was likely unless the merger was
"not likely substantially to lessen competition."'68
The 1988 Guidelines also establish safe harbors for certain foreign
acquisitions, although the 1988 Guidelines do not expressly describe
them as safe harbors. Case 4 shows that the Division, due to the practi-
cal difficulty of obtaining effective relief, will not challenge a merger
between two foreign firms where "all of their assets involved in produc-
ing and distributing [the relevant product] are located outside the
United States."6 9 Case 3 shows that the Division will not challenge the
acquisition of a foreign firm that does not currently compete in the U.S.
unless the Division can show that the firm actually "would enter the
[U.S.] market independently in the near future" were it not for the
merger.70 By contrast, Case B of the 1977 Guide permitted the Division
to challenge the acquisition of a foreign firm as long as the Division
showed that the firm had the incentives and capability of entering the
U.S. market.71
Perhaps most significantly, the 1988 Guidelines omit any mention
of the 1984 Merger Guidelines' second threshold for mergers in highly
concentrated markets. According to the 1984 Merger Guidelines, a
merger that resulted in an increase in the HHI of more than 100 in a
highly concentrated market would be presumptively illegal. The gov-
ernment would look to factors other than market share and market con-
centration to establish a merger's legality "only in extraordinary
cases." 7 2 The 1988 Guidelines do not identify a merger in highly con-
centrated markets as presumptively illegal. As with any other merger
that falls outside of all safe harbors, the 1988 Guidelines explain that the
Division will consider the merger's "effect on concentration along with
all other relevant factors bearing on whether the merger would likely
create, enhance, or facilitate the exercise of market power."'78
The Draft Guidelines issued inJune 1988 ("Draft Revision of 1988
Guidelines") had stated that the Division would not "automatically chal-
lenge" mergers resulting in market concentrations that exceeded the
safe harbor thresholds; but, rather, they stated that "much more exten-
sive analysis of factors other than concentration data [would be] neces-
sary to conclude that such mergers would create, enhance, or facilitate
the exercise of market power."7 4 The ABA Task Force Report on the
Draft Guidelines ("ABA Report on Draft Guidelines") pointed out that
68. Compare 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, pt. I, No. 3.32, 13,109.10, at 20,598,
with 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 24, 13,103, at 20,560-61.
69. 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, 13,109.83, at 20,620-21. Cf. U.S. v. CIBA
Corp., 1970 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (consent decree requiring
merging Swiss chemical companies to divest specified assets of U.S. subsidiaries).
70. 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, 13,109.82, at 20,619-20.
71. 1977 Guide, supra note 15, Case B, 13,110, at 20,648-49.
72. 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 24, 13,103, at 20,560-61.
73. 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, pt. I, No. 3.32, 13,109.10, at 20,598.
74. Draft Revision of 1988 Guidelines, pt. I.B.2, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 54, at S-7 n. 58 (June 9, 1988) (Special Supp.).
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the Draft Guideline language "implies a significant shift in the presump-
tions accorded the concentration thresholds, and greatly reduces the
significance of the numerical index itself."'75 The Report stated, and we
concur, that the Draft Guideline language "is probably a more accurate
description of current Division practice" than is the language of the
1984 Merger Guidelines. 76 The Report also warned, however, that the
shift in presumptions had caused "a confusion that should be clarified in
the final version of the Guidelines." 77 The final version of the 1988
Guidelines states that they do not offer "bright line tests except to the
extent that they define 'safe harbors.' "78 Thus, while the mechanical
application to mergers of the 1988 Guidelines (assuming that they can
be applied "mechanically") may support the conclusion that the Division
will not challenge a particular merger, the 1988 Guidelines do not sup-
port the conclusion that the Division will likely or should challenge a
particular merger.
Ordinarily, guidelines that provide only safe harbors have two
advantages: they provide businesses with the option of avoiding any
appreciable risk of liability by confining their activities to the enunciated
safe harbors, and they provide the enforcement agency with the flexibil-
ity to refrain from prosecuting in any given set of circumstances. Unfor-
tunately, given that private litigants will challenge mergers
notwithstanding Division action, a harbor that only the Division has
declared safe is probably not safe enough. As a result, the 1988 Guide-
lines will more likely provide an intellectual basis for the Division's deci-
sion not to oppose certain mergers than provide practical guidance to
businessmen and lawyers.
b. Additional Uses of Merger Safe Harbors
The 1988 Guidelines send a clear message that the Division will use the
HHI safe harbors not only in merger analysis but also as part of the
preliminary analyses ofjoint ventures and licensing arrangements. Such
an approach to regulation of these arrangements is conceptually useful
and may allow the parties to short-cut Division inquiries when good
market data exists.
According to the 1988 Guidelines, in determining whether a joint
venture would likely have an anticompetitive effect in the joint venture
75. ABA Section of Antitrust Law and Section of International Trade and Practice, Report to
the House of Delegates, [On Draft Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations] [hereinaf-
ter ABA Report on Draft Guidelines], 57 ANT'TUST L.J. 651, 672 (1988).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, pt. I, No. 3.32, 13,109.10, at 20,598. Accord-
ing to the ABA, "[w]hile the discussion from the draft is amplified and refined, the
message remains the same: only mergers that are both above the HHI thresholds
and demonstrate a high likelihood of hurting consumer welfare will be challenged."
ABA Section of Antitrust Law and Section of International Trade and Practice, Report: Analysis
of Department of Justice Guidelines for International Operations Antitrust Enforcement Policy
(Final Version) [hereinafter ABA Report on Final Guidelines], 57 ANTRcUST L.J. 957, 960
(1989).
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market, the Division first considers the effect on concentration of a
hypothetical merger of the parties.
If, based on market concentration, the Division would not challenge a
merger of the joint venture participants in a relevant market, then the
Division would conclude without detailed examination of other factors
that the joint venture and its individual restraints would not likely have
any anticompetitive effect in that market, and would proceed to step 2
[consideration of other markets]. 7 9
The Division would use a similar approach in assessing a joint ven-
ture's effect on competition in a "relevant spill-over market." 8 0 For
example, an R&D joint venture (a venture to engage in research and
development) might affect competition in a spill-over market composed
of products that are made using that R&D. In such a case, the Division
would determine first whether a hypothetical merger of the joint venture
participants would fall within an HHI safe harbor for that spill-over mar-
ket.8 1 The Draft Revision of 1988 Guidelines further provides in Case 6
("Research and Development Joint Venture") that "the actual or poten-
tial existence of four comparable R&D efforts creates a 'safe harbor'"
for an R&D joint venture that constitutes one of these R&D efforts.8 2
The ABA Report on the Draft Guidelines noted a "troublesome incon-
sistency" between this statement and the use of the HHI to identify safe
harbors since a market consisting solely of four comparable R&D ven-
tures would necessarily constitute a highly concentrated market (with an
HHI likely over 2500).8s The final version of the 1988 Guidelines, while
deleting the express reference to a "safe harbor" under these circum-
stances, retains the statement appearing in the Draft Guidelines that an
anticompetitive effect is "unlikely where there are at least four compara-
ble R&D efforts underway or where there is a substantial potential for
such efforts by firms or groups of firms included in the market."18 4
The 1988 Guidelines also suggest that the Division will apply the
HHI safe harbors, already applicable to mergers and joint ventures, to
intellectual property licensing arrangements. The 1988 Guidelines state
that in considering whether a licensing arrangement would have an
anticompetitive effect in the market for the licensed technology, the
Division first considers "whether the complete elimination of competi-
tion by merger between the licensee and licensor would likely lead to the
unilateral or collective exercise of market power with respect to the
licensing of technologies in [the relevant technology markets]."85 This
analysis entails assigning market shares to each technology based on
"the best available evidence of the relative efficiencies of the technolo-
79. 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, Pt. I, No. 3.42, 13,109.10, at 20,600.
80. Id, pt. I, No. 3.43, at 20,601-02.
81. Id. at 20,602.
82. Draft Revision of 1988 Guidelines, supra note 74, at S-23.
83. ABA Report on Draft Guidelines, supra note 75, at 676-77.
84. 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, Case 6, 13,109.85, at 20,625.
85. Id, pt. I, No. 3.63, 13,109.10, at 20,607.
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gies," with equal market shares being assigned to each technology "[i]f
it appears that [the] competing technologies are all comparably effi-
cient."'8 6 Of course, the absence of clear standards for determining
market concentration in a technology market reduces the usefulness of
HHI safe harbors in providing assurance that a particular licensing
arrangement does not raise serious antitrust concerns.
According to the 1988 Guidelines, the Division will use merger
analysis safe harbors in determining a licensing arrangement's potential
for producing an anticompetitive "spill-over" effect in a market other
than the technology licensing market (such as in a market in which the
technology constitutes an input).8 7 As it does in analyzing the technol-
ogy licensing market, the Division considers, first, whether a merger of
the licensor and its licensee in the market under consideration would fall
within a safe harbor, and, therefore, not be anticompetitive."8 This
approach, as illustrated by Case 11 ("Exclusive Patent Cross Licenses
with Grantbacks"), results in a determination that no anticompetitive
effect exists if either the licensor or the licensee have an insignificant
presence in the spill-over market.8 9 Moreover, in quantifying the licen-
see's presence in a spill-over market, one "would consider only sales
that [the licensee] would have made without having access to [the licen-
sor's] technology." 90
c. Territorial Restrictions
Perhaps the greatest contrast between the 1988 Guidelines and the 1977
Guide is their respective approaches to territorial restraints ancillary to
arrangements such as exclusive distributorships, licensing, and joint
ventures. The shift was in part in reaction to the Supreme Court's
landmark opinion in Continental T. V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,91 rendered
just five months after the issuance of the 1977 Guide. The 1988 Guide-
lines appear to have abandoned any concern regarding competitors' use
of ancillary restrictions to allocate territories. As the ABA Task Force
Report on the Draft Guidelines observed, if "the parties are direct,
actual, or potential competitors, there must be some room for doubt
about the initial determination that the arrangement is not an unlawful
allocation of markets." 92
86. Id.
87. Id., pt. I, No. 3.64, 13,109.10, at 20,608.
88. Id at 20,608-609.
89. Id., Case 11, 13,109.90, at 20,634.
90. Id., Case 12, 13,109.91, at 20,637.
91. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Sylvania held that nonprice vertical restrictions were not
per se illegal, as the Supreme Court had held in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), but rather that courts should judge them under a rule of
reason.
92. ABA Report on Draft Guidelines, supra note 75, at 674.
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1. Case Example 7: Exclusive Distributorships
The 1988 Guidelines differ most from the 1977 Guide in their treatment
of case examples concerning exclusive distributorships. Case J of the
1977 Guide93 and Case 7 of the 1988 Guidelines 9 4 present nearly iden-
tical factual patterns, but very dissimilar analyses and outcomes. Both
cases involve the mutual appointment by a U.S. manufacturer and a Ger-
man manufacturer of each other as exclusive distributor in North
America and in the EEC, respectively. 9 5 Both firms manufacture
machine tools, and their respective products are, for the most part,
either complementary or sufficiently different so that they are not inter-
changeable in use.9 6
According to the 1977 case discussion, each party to the arrange-
ment represents a "substantial manufacturer who can (or could) com-
pete in the territory of the other," and the firms have not confined the
scope of the exclusive distributorship provisions to products over which
the firms do not compete. 97 According to the discussion, the exclusive
distribution arrangement creates a "territorial allocation" and thus is
illegal per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act.98
The 1988 case discussion, by contrast, emphasizes that the firms'
product lines seem to be "largely complementary," that the arrange-
ment "appears to involve a form of economic integration of the parties'
operations," and that the arrangement is "open and notorious." 99
These factors, the 1988 Guidelines maintain, justify analyzing the exclu-
sive distributorships under the rule of reason.10 0 According to the dis-
cussion, the arrangement would, arguably, permit both firms to
distribute machine tools in the U.S. more effectively.
2. Case Example 12: Know-How Licensing
The 1977 Guide and 1988 Guidelines also present the contrasting
approaches to ancillary territorial restraints in the case examples per-
taining to know-how licensing. 10 ' In Case F of the 1977 Guide' 0 2 and
Case 12 of the 1988 Guidelines,10 3 a small U.S. corporation with "valua-
93. 1977 Guide, supra note 15, Case J, 13,110, at 20,649-12 49-13.
94. 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, Case 7, 13,109.86, at 20,627-29.
95. 1977 Guide, supra note 15, case J, 13,110 at 20,649-12; 1988 Guidelines,
supra note 3, Case 7, 13,109.86, at 627.
96. Id
97. 1977 Guide, supra note 15, Case J, 113,110, at 20,649-12 -49-13.
98. Id; 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, Case 7, 13,109.86 at 627.
99. 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, Case 7, 1 13,109.86, at 20,627-29.
100. Id
101. Cf. Remarks by Charles F. Rule, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, Conference sponsored by World Trade Ass'n & Cincinnati Patent Law
Ass'n (Oct. 21, 1986) (discussing application of U.S. antitrust laws to international
licensing agreements), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,131 (1988). The
Department acknowledged that it had "dramatically changed its attitude toward
licensing, whether international or domestic." Id. at 20,733.
102. 1977 Guide, supra note 15, Case F, 13,110, at 20,649-7 -49-8.
103. 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, Case 12, 13,109.91, 20,675.
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ble" unpatented technology agrees to license the know-how for twenty
years to a large, well-financed foreign manufacturer. Both case exam-
ples involve restrictions on the foreign manufacturer's right to sell cer-
tain products in the U.S. In Case F, the U.S. corporation restricts the
foreign manufacturer for the twenty-year term of the license from com-
peting in the U.S. in any product for which the licensed technology is
used.104 In Case 12, the foreign corporation uses the know-how at issue
to produce a particular product, and the U.S. corporation prohibits the
foreign manufacturer for twenty years from selling any of the product in
the U.S., irrespective of whether the foreign company manufactured it
using the licensed technology. 10 5
According to the 1977 Guide's discussion of Case F, the Division
would likely challenge the twenty-year restriction on the ability of a
major foreign manufacturer to enter the U.S. market if twenty years
exceeded the time needed for "reverse-engineering" of the technology
involved, unless the parties could justify the restriction in some way. 106
Thus, while the parties might persuade the Division to allow an unneces-
sarily long restriction, the restriction would appear to face a presump-
tion of illegality.
The 1988 Guidelines' discussion of Case 12, on the other hand,
proceeds with a rule-of-reason analysis of the territorial restriction that
makes no mention of its longevity. 10 7 The 1988 discussion also does
not suggest any predisposition to challenge the restriction, even though
the restriction applies to sales of the product manufactured without using
the licensed know-how. The discussion emphasizes, instead, that the
restriction on U.S. sales "could encourage the transfer of know-how in
the first place" by preventing the recipient from reducing the value of
the know-how.' 08 While acknowledging that one could make the argu-
ment that "U.S. consumers would not be the primary beneficiaries of the
transfer of... know-how," the 1988 Guidelines posit that the enabling
of the U.S. firm "to exploit its technology in foreign markets serves to
stimulate the production of technology that ultimately benefits U.S.
consumers."'
109
3. Case Example 11: Patent Rights
The 1988 Guidelines depart from the 1977 Guide in their apparent
endorsement of the use of grantback provisions in patent licenses to
allocate patent rights territorially. In Case 11, a U.S. firm and a Japa-
nese firm cross-license one another to practice their Japanese and U.S.
patents, respectively. "0 A grantback clause in each license requires the
104. 1977 Guide, supra note 15, Case F, 13,110, at 20,649-7.
105. 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, Case 12, 13,109.91, at 20,636.
106. 1977 Guide, supra note 15, Case F, 13,110, at 20,649-9.
107. 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, Case 12, 13,109.9,1 at 636.
108. Id. at 638.
109. Id
110. Id., Case 11, 13,109.90, 20,633-35.
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licensee, for any patented improvements it makes on the licensor's tech-
nology, to assign the licensor exclusive rights to practice the improve-
ments in the licensor's home country. The teaching of this case is that a
grantback of patent rights constitutes a "logical choice" for "compen-
sat[ing] the patentee for improvements developed by the licensee that
the licensee could not have developed without having access to the pat-
entee's technology." 11
The discussion of Case I ("Exclusive Grantback Licensing") in the
1977 Guide, by contrast, warns that such an arrangement "may isolate
the U.S. market from significant import competition from a leading for-
eign firm" and suggests that license agreements should make grantbacks
nonexclusive to avoid uncertainties as to their legality. 12
4. Case Example 6: Joint Ventures
The 1988 Guidelines also look relatively favorably upon territorial allo-
cations by joint venturers. Case 6 concerns a research and development
joint venture formed by three large U.S. producers of X-metal and a
large EEC producer of X-metal. 1 13 For each new process patent it
obtains, the joint venture grants licenses in North America to the U.S.
venture partners and licenses in the EEC (and certain other countries) to
the EEC venture partner."14 Such an arrangement, as described so far,
should pass muster under the 1977 Guide on the ground that the
enforcement of process patent rights alone would not result in territorial
division of the X-metal product market.' '5
Case 6, however, expands upon the hypothetical; the EEC venture
partner agrees not to sell in North America any X-metal produced using
the licensed technology.1 6 The 1988 Guidelines, in applying a rule-of-
reason analysis to the territorial restriction in Case 6, appear to com-
mend the arrangement:
Joint venture partners who have created a new technology may desire to
control the processes and products that incorporate or are a complement
to that technology in order to recover as quickly and fully as possible the
value of their inventive efforts. Without such joint coordination, the
value of the parties' R&D might be dissipated through competition in the
product market .... Coordination in markets using the technology out-
put of the joint venture is therefore often essential to beneficial R&D., 17
Finally, the discussion of joint research in the 1988 Guidelines
makes no reference to the "general rule" set forth in the 1977 Guide
that "aggregations of patents cannot be used to create broad territorial
111. Id., Case 12, 13,109.91, at 20,635-38.
112. 1977 Guide, supra note 15, Case I, 1 13,110, at 20,649-10 -49-12. See generally
ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 37, at 496-97 (2d ed. 1984) (collecting
grantback cases).
113. 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, Case 6, 13,109.85, 20,623-27.
114. Id at 20,623.
115. 1977 Guide, supra note 15, Case D, $ 13,110, at 20,649-5.
116. 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, Case 6, 1 13,109.85, at 20,624.
117. Id., Case 6, T 13,109.85, at 20,626.
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allocations going beyond any single patent or discrete group of
patents."1 1 8
d. Trade Law Proceedings
Three of the eighteen case examples in the 1988 Guidelines focus on
antitrust issues raised by firms' pursuit of remedies under the U.S. trade
laws. The 1977 Guide did not address this area through case examples.
These three cases merit special attention because they represent an
enforcement area in which the Division will more likely bring an action
than will the States or a private party. Thus, the standards established
by the Division in this area may serve a useful prescriptive function. The
cases concern the filing of an action under a trade law to prohibit the
importation of a rival's product into the U.S., 1 19 an agreement between
U.S. producers and foreign producers to settle a trade case, 120 and an
exchange of information by U.S. producers in the course ofjointly seek-
ing relief under the U.S. trade laws. 12 1
1. Case Example 13: Filing an Action Under Trade Law to Prohibit Rival
Import
In Case 13, a major U.S. chemical company files an action under section
337 of the 1930 Tariff Act1 22 seeking an order from the U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission excluding imports from a small Italian chemi-
cal producer on the grounds that the Italian producer makes the good
using a process protected by the U.S. company's U.S. patent. 12 3 The
U.S. company's technical staff has informed the company's management
that the Italian process falls outside the scope of the patent.' 24 Manage-
ment, however, decides to file the action in the hope of saddling the
Italian firm with costs and delays and thereby deterring it from compet-
ing in the U.S. 125
According to the 1988 Guidelines, the filing of a trade action is a
sham and, therefore, unprotected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.' 26 If
"Oj]udged objectively," there "was no reasonable basis for the petitioner
to believe that the action had merit," or "the Division had evidence that
the petitioner believed the claim to be baseless."' 2 7 The second half of
this formulation (concerning evidence of the petitioner's subjective
belief as to the merits of its claim) does not appear terribly useful since
attorney-client or work product privileges may often protect such evi-
118. Id.
119. 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, Case 13, 13,109.92, at 20,638-39.
120. Id., Case 17, 13,109.96, at 20,641-42.
121. Id., Case 18, 13,109.97, at 20,642-43.
122. Tarriff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1980 & Supp. 1989).
123. 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, Case 13, 13,109.92, at 20,638-39.
124. Id at 20,638.
125. Id.
126. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127
(1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
127. 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, Case 13, 13,109.92, at 20,638-39.
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dence from discovery. The 1988 Guidelines state that "[a]lthough most
litigated findings of sham petitioning have involved a pattern of abuse, a
single anticompetitive abuse of governmental processes may suffice in
appropriate circumstances."' 2 8
2. Case Example 17: International Agreement to Settle Case
In Case 17, the producers of X in a foreign country offer to raise their
U.S. prices by a given amount to settle a dumping case brought by the
three largest U.S. producers of X. 129 According to the case discussion,
if the U.S. producers accept this offer, they will have entered into a per se
illegal agreement to raise prices and "[t]he fact that the agreement pur-
ported to settle a dumping case would not constitute a defense."'8 0
Only settlement agreements entered into pursuant to the suspension
agreement provisions of the antidumping law enjoy an "implied immu-
nity" from antitrust prosecution.' 8 '
3. Case Example 18: Exchange of Information Among U.S. Producers Seeking
Relief Under U.S. Trade Laws
Finally, in Case 18, three U.S. producers of X, in preparing their ulti-
mately successful antidumping case against the producers of X in a for-
eign country, exchange among themselves cost and price data relating
to specific transactions.1 32 The 1988 Guidelines state that in such a situ-
ation the Division would first determine whether the exchange was
"incidental to prosecuting the antidumping case" and, therefore, pro-
tected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, and, if not, "whether on bal-
ance the exchange was likely to be anticompetitive (i.e. whether it would
make collusion more likely)."' 83 The 1988 Guidelines note that in
order to avoid raising antitrust issues, competitors can provide sensitive
information to an intermediary, like an independent accounting firm,
which can then aggregate the information for use in trade proceedings
without disclosing the particular data submitted by each firm.13 4
128. Id, pt. I, 13,109.10, at 20,614.
129. Id., Case 17, 113,109.96, 20,641-42.
130. Id at 20,641.
131. 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(b)-O) (1980 & Supp. 1989).
132. 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, Case 18, 13,109.97, at 20,642-43. This case
example responds to the ABA Task Force's recommendation that the Guidelines
address the antitrust issues that may be implicated by cooperation in prosecuting or
defending a trade law case. ABA Report on Draft Guidelines, supra note 75, at 683-84.
133. 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, 13.109.97, at 20,643.
134. The ABA Task Force criticizes this case example for "presuming that Noerr
does not apply" and for fWling to "articulate the extent to which members of a U.S.
industry may cooperate in prosecuting a case." ABA Report on Final Guidelines, supra
note 78, at 970. However, the fact that the antidumping case is described as ulti-
mately successful would seem to indicate that the case example presumes that Noerr
does apply to the prosecution as a whole. At the same time, the case example help-
fully points out that the protection afforded a prosecution by Noerr does not automat-
ically extend to all exchanges of information by the cooperating parties, and that the
parties should avoid direct'exchanges of information.
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These three case examples dearly illustrate some of the antitrust
risks that firms may face in pursuing remedies under the trade laws, in
settling trade cases, and in exchanging information for use in trade pro-
ceedings. These examples warn firms of both the limited nature of the
antitrust immunity bestowed by Noerr-Pennington and the danger of set-
tling a trade case in a manner not specifically provided for under U.S.
trade law.
e. Requiring a Strict Compulsion Test for Immunity Based on a
Mandate from a Foreign Government
The 1988 Guidelines insist that antitrust law requires government com-
pulsion in the foreign context, even though domestic law requires only
government-supervised voluntarism pursuant to a dearly articulated
state policy. 13 5 The 1988 Guidelines offer a less than satisfying explana-
tion of why the Division will not apply the state action doctrine to for-
eign governments:
The Division believes that the defense of foreign sovereign compul-
sion must be distinguished from the federalism-based state action doc-
trine. The state action doctrine applies to private anticompetitive
conduct that is taken pursuant to clearly articulated state policies and is
subject to active state supervision, as well as to conduct that actually is
compelled by a state. The doctrine embodies the notion that the U.S.
Congress should not be presumed to have intended to interfere with the
authority of the states constitutionally "to regulate their domestic com-
merce." Because our federal structure of government is designed to
secure to the states a wide range of regulatory alternatives, the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that compulsion is too strict a standard to
employ in state action cases. At the same time, the federal government
retains authority under the Supremacy Clause to void any state program
that has a noxious effect on interstate commerce. In contrast, the sover-
eign compulsion defense serves the quite different purposes of prevent-
ing direct clashes with the most significant interests of foreign sovereigns
and of protecting parties whose actions are compelled by a foreign sover-
eign from being unfairly condemned under the U.S. antitrust laws. These
purposes are advanced most directly when the foreign government has
actually compelled the challenged conduct.13 6
Are we to presume that Congress intended to interfere with the author-
ity offoreign governments "to regulate their domestic commerce" or that
our structure of government is designed to curtail the "wide range of
regulatory alternatives" available to foreign governments? Likewise, are
135. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf., Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48(1985), held that collective ratemaking activities of common carriers, though not
compelled by the States, enjoyed Sherman Act immunity under the "state action"
doctrine. The Court reasoned that a "compulsion requirement" would reduce "the
range of regulatory alternatives available to the State" and that "insofar as it encour-
ages States to require, rather than merely permit, anticompetitive conduct ... may
result in greater restraints on trade." Id. at 61.
136. 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, Pt. I, 13,109.10, at 20,613-14 (footnotes
omitted).
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we to believe that the state action doctrine serves any purpose other
than to prevent "direct clashes" with significant state interests? The
Division's strained (and undiplomatic) analysis overlooks the starting
point of the Supreme Court's discussion of state action in Parker v. Brown
that "[tfhe governments of the states are sovereign within their territory save only
as they are subject to the prohibitions of the Constitution or as their
action in some measure conflicts with powers delegated to the National
Government, or with Congressional legislation enacted in the exercise
of those powers."' 3 7
While the state action doctrine as currently applied 13 8 is overly tol-
erant of cartelization that is fortunate enough to be under nominal state
supervision, the Division has failed to articulate a principled basis for
treating more stringently cartelization that occurs under the supervision
of foreign governments. Indeed, the Supreme Court's recent articula-
tion of the rationale for permitting private parties to claim "state action"
immunity appears equally applicable to foreign programs that restrain
competition.' 3 9 The absence of an international analogue of the
Supremacy Clause would seem to justify even more lenient treatment of
foreign-supervised cartels. 140
f. Attitude Toward U.S. Exporters
The Division reveals in a footnote of the 1988 Guidelines that it consid-
ers U.S. exporters to be no more than incidental beneficiaries of its anti-
trust enforcement efforts:
Although the [Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 198214 1]
extends jurisdiction under the Sherman Act to conduct that has a direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on the export trade or
export commerce of a person engaged in such commerce in the United
States, the Division is concerned only with adverse effects on competition
that would harm U.S. consumers by reducing output or raising prices. 142
The 1977 Guide, by contrast, treated the prevention of anticompetitive
137. 317 U.S. 341, 359-60 (1943) (establishing state action doctrine) (emphasis
added).
138. See generally A.B.A. ANTrrRUST SECTION, ANTrrusT LAw DEVELOPMENTS (SEC-
OND) X-6 - X-8 & n.63e (2d Supp. 1988) (collecting cases).
139. Patrick v. Burget, 108 S.Ct. 1658, 1662 (1988) (if the Sherman Act were
always enforced against private practices, "then a State could not effectively imple-
ment a program restraining competition among them.").
140. The ABA Task Force Report observed: "Sovereign foreign states, entitled as
a matter of international law to equal status with the United States federal govern-
ment, deserve at least as much respect for their regulatory actions as semi-sovereign
states within our federal system." ABA Report on Draft Guidelines, supra note 75, at 669
(1988). The Task Force fears that its views on this issue have "fallen on deaf ears"
given the identical positions taken by the Department in the draft and final Guide-
lines. ABA Report on Final Guidelines, supra note 78, at 967.
141. Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV §§ 401-403, 96 Stat. 1246 (1982) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ I note 6a, 45).
142. 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, pt. I, No. 4.1, n.159, 13,109.10, at 20,611.
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injury to U.S. exporters as a legitimate goal of the antitrust laws. 143 At
first blush, the Division's current view appears to follow logically from
its policy not to "reach anticompetitive conduct that has no effect, or
only a remote effect, on U.S. consumer welfare."' 144 However, as the
Division appears to acknowledge in the above-quoted footnote, Con-
gress has not drawn the line that the Division seeks to draw between
protection of U.S. consumers and protection of U.S. exporters. It is not
even clear that these goals are actually separable. Anticompetitive injury
to U.S. competitors hurts the productive efficiency of the U.S. economy
and, in turn, the ability to generate national income. Thus, in the long
run, anticompetitive injury to U.S. competitors may have a significant
adverse effect on U.S. consumers.
The A.B.A. Report on Draft Guidelines correctly pointed out that
the Division's approach in the 1988 Guidelines "is a significant revision,
legislative in nature, of the antitrust implications of export commerce
compared with the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of
1982."' 45 In enacting the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act,
Congress dearly contemplated on the premise that "injury to a U.S.
exporter's export business in the United States can give rise to an anti-
trust claim."'146 The A.B.A. Report recommended that the jurisdictional
test of the 1988 Guidelines require "an anticompetitive effect in the United
States, as set out in National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Associa-
tion."1 4 7 National Bank of Canada would base jurisdiction on "any
anticompetitive effect upon United States commerce, either commerce
within the United States or export commerce from the United
States,"' 48 rather than limit jurisdiction to restraints which harm U.S.
consumers through anticompetitive effects.
Increased concern regarding possible anticompetitive conduct and
lax antitrust enforcement abroad has led the Division to reassess the
1988 Guidelines "to make clear that the department will not tolerate
violations of the U.S. antitrust laws, where we have jurisdiction that
impair export opportunities for U.S. business."' 4 9 The Division noted,
in particular, "a perception that price fixing, bid rigging, market alloca-
tion, and group boycotts have become very prevalent in Japan."' 5 0
143. See 1977 Guide, supra note 15, Case N, 13,110, at 20,649-16 -49-17 (consid-
ering activity to restrain U.S. exports to a foreign country). Cf. 1988 Guidelines,
supra note 3, Case 15, 13,109.94, at 20,640 (patterned after Case N of 1977 Guide,
but involving a restraint on a foreign country's exports to the U.S.).
144. 1988 Guidelines, supra note 3, 13,109.10, at 20,589-3.
145. ABA Report on Draft Guidelines, supra note 75, at 656.
146. Id
147. Id. at 661.
148. 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1981).
149. 58 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 554 (1990) (quoting statement by
Assistant Attorney General James F. Rill on April 9, 1990).
150. Id
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Conclusion
The ultimate test of a set of enforcement guidelines is whether they
actually guide somebody. Only time can verify this test of utility. We
cannot render a verdict so soon after the issuance of the 1988 Guide-
lines. The Bush Administration's antitrust team has neither embraced
nor distanced itself from them. The government has neither prosecuted
nor refrained from prosecuting a case relying on their principles. Most
likely, in contrast to the numerous domestic merger cases, not many
international investigations and cases exist; moreover, private litigants
have not yet used the 1988 Guidelines to resolve any cases. Hence, it
may take a long time to render a final judgment on their success. If the
government or courts find the 1988 effort useful in resolving specific
issues, then the 1988 Guidelines may take an important place in the anti-
trust history of the 1990s. If not, they will likely find themselves as late
Reagan-era footnotes in some scholarly journals.
1990 The 1988 International Antitrust Guidelines
APPENDIX A
PLAIN ENGLISH SUMMARY OF THE 1988 INTERNATIONAL
GUIDELINES
1. Introduction
The Guidelines seek to provide practical guidance on the Department's
policies. They are not a restatement of the law currently being applied
by the courts. Even if the Guidelines suggest that the Department would
not bring suit, a suit could still be brought by a private party, a state, a
foreign country, or the FTC. Seek advice from experienced private
antitrust counsel.
2. Relevant Antitrust Laws
Antitrust enforcement by the Department is likely to be based on the
Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. Limited
antitrust exemptions are provided in the National Cooperative Research
Act of 1984, the Webb-Pomerene Act, and the Export Trading Company
Act of 1982. Only the Sherman Act provides for criminal penalties.
3. Enforcement Policy
3.0 Restraints of trade are illegal only if they are "unreasonable." To be
"unreasonable," they must increase market power or facilitate its use in
some defined market. Agreements involving some integration, like R&D
joint ventures, are evaluated under the rule of reason. An agreement
will pass muster under the rule of reason if it would not be
anticompetitive, or if the risk of anticompetitive harm is outweighed by
procompetitive efficiencies. "Naked" restraints, like price-fixing and bid-
rigging, are condemned per se.
3.1 Criminal Violations of the Sherman Act
Naked agreements to raise price are criminally prosecuted.
3.2 Monopolization
Conduct will not be challenged as unlawful monopolization if there is
not a dangerous probability of successful monopolization, or if the
conduct is not predatory. Usually, conduct that appears to be predatory
is not really predatory. Pricing above marginal cost is never predatory,
but abuse of governmental processes may be predatory.
3.3 Mergers
Look to the Department's 1984 Merger Guidelines for the standards
applied to mergers.
3.31 Market Definition
Market definition is the first step. To define the relevant markets,
identify a group of products and a geographic area which, if
monopolized, would permit the exercise of market power.
3.32 Competitive Analysis
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is used to identify "safe
harbors" within which mergers will not be challenged. A merger that
does not fall within a "safe harbor" must be evaluated to determine
whether it would be likely to increase market power or facilitate its use.
Among the factors considered are the firms' future competitive
significance, ease of entry, efficiencies, and foreign competition. If
subject to effective trade restraints, foreign firms may have little or no
competitive significance.
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3.4 Joint Ventures
Joint venture" covers any collaboration among firms, falling short of
merger, that concerns R&D, production, distribution, or marketing and
which is designed to achieve efficiencies. Bona fide joint ventures are
evaluated under a rule of reason.
3.41 Rule-of-Reason Analysis
Rule-of-reason analysis ofjoint ventures involves up to four steps. In
the first three steps, the Department looks for significant anticompetitive
risks, and, if such risks are present, the Department goes on in the
fourth step to consider procompetitive efficiencies.
3.42 Step 1 - The Joint Venture Market or Markets
If the participating firms would have been allowed to merge outright
based on HHI concentration, then their joint venture automatically
survives based on step 1 of the analysis. If not, the Department goes on
to consider whether the joint venture will restrict price and output
decision making less than a merger would have. Anticompetitive effects
are generally enhanced if a joint venture includes most of the
competitors in a given market.
Restrictions on membership often enhance procompetitive potential.
3.43 Step 2 - Other Markets
Some aspects ofjoint venture relationships, such as information
exchanges, may have "spillover" effects in other markets. A rule of
reason approach is used to determine whether the joint venture would
be likely to facilitate collusion outside the joint venture market.
3.44 Step 3 - Vertical Restraints Analysis
Any vertical nonprice restraints in a joint venture are analyzed for
possible anticompetitive effect according to the method set forth in
Section 3.5, below.
3.45 Step 4 - Offsetting Efficiency Benefits
Claimed efficiency benefits for an anticompetitive joint venture must be
proved by dear and convincing evidence. Before approving such a joint
venture, the Department is likely to require that an anticompetitive
restriction that does not contribute to the claimed efficiencies be
stricken.
3.5 Vertical Nonprice Distribution Restraints
Vertical nonprice restraints often promote competition by allowing more
efficient distribution of a manufacturer's products. Under certain market
conditions, however, such restraints could facilitate collusion among
manufacturers or among dealers. They could also have the
anticompetitive effect of excluding competitors from an essential input
or essential distribution facility. The Department will normally not
challenge a vertical nonprice restraint if (1) the market share of the firm
imposing it is 10% or less, or (2) the affected market is not highly
concentrated, or (3) entry into such market is not difficult, or (4) the risk
of anticompetitive harm is outweighed by procompetitive efficiency
benefits. A distribution restraint that "may only incidentally affect price"
will be treated as a non-price restraint and will be analyzed under the
rule of reason.
3.6 Intellectual Property Licensing Arrangements
While intellectual property does not necessarily confer market power,
the owner of such property is entitled to whatever market power is in
fact conferred.
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3.61 Licensing Benefits
If license restrictions would likely increase market power or facilitate its
use in a way that goes beyond the market power necessarily conferred
by the intellectual property itself, the Department balances that risk
against any efficiency benefits. Tie-ins or package licenses can be used
as devices for metering licensees' use and differentiating among them on
that basis.
3.62 Rule-of-Reason Analysis
Rule-of-reason analysis of intellectual property licensing arrangements
involves up to four steps, much like the rule-of-reason analysis ofjoint
ventures set forth in Sections 3.41-3.45 above.
3.63 Step 1 - The Technology Licensing Market
The Department first considers whether an outright merger of the
licensee and licensor would be anticompetitive. Only if this is so does
the Department go on to consider whether the license restriction will
restrict price and output decision making less than a merger would have.
In general, "open" patent pools are more likely to create competitive
problems than are "dosed" (exclusive) patent pools.
3.64 Step 2 - Other Markets
A rule of reason approach is used to determine whether license
restrictions or features, such as information exchanges, may have an
anticompetitive "spill-over" effect in a market other than the technology
licensing market.
3.65 Step 3 - Vertical Restraints Analysis
Any vertical restraints in a license are analyzed for possible
anticompetitive effect according to the method set forth in Section 3.5.
If there are no economic substitutes for the licensed technology, purely
vertical restraints are unlikely ever to be anticompetitive.
3.66 Step 4 - Offsetting Efficiency Benefits
Claimed efficiency benefits for an anticompetitive licensing arrangement
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Before approving
such a licensing arrangement, the Department is likely to require that an
anticompetitive restriction that does not contribute to the claimed
efficiencies be stricken.
4. Jurisdictional Considerations
4.0 The U.S. antitrust laws apply to foreign conduct that relates to U.S.
import trade and harms consumers in the U.S.
4.1 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982
Notwithstanding the broader jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act (as
refined in the 1982 Act), the Department is concerned only with
anticompetitive conduct that harms U.S. consumers, not with conduct
that merely harms export trade or export commerce. However, when
more than half the cost of purchasing export goods or services has been
borne by the U.S. Government (whether in the form of a payment or
financing), jurisdiction will be asserted by the Department.
4.2 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
The "commercial activity" of foreign sovereigns and their agencies is
within the purview of U.S. antitrust laws.
5. Factors Affecting The Departments Discretion In Asserting Jurisdiction
Comity considerations are weighed in deciding whether to assert
jurisdiction, and, in extraordinary circumstances, the Department
considers effects on U.S. foreign relations. However, suits brought by
the Department should never be dismissed by the courts on the basis of
comity or foreign policy concerns.
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6. Foreign Sovereign Compulsion
Anticompetitive conduct compelled by a foreign sovereign will not be
prosecuted unless the conduct occurred primarily in the U.S. The
necessary compulsion may have come from the imposition of penalties
or from the withholding of benefits. Mere encouragement is not
enough. The Department does not apply the domestic "state action"
doctrine to the actions of foreign sovereigns. Comity considerations may
still cause the Department to decline prosecution against some
anticompetitive conduct that "is not strictly compelled."
7. International Trade Function And The U.S. Trade Laws
The joint conduct of competitors in petitioning the U.S. Government or
foreign governments is protected under the so-called Noerr-Pennington
doctrine. Such petitioning activity will not be prosecuted unless it was a
sham. A "naked" restraint is not protected simply because a
government official, U.S. or foreign, is involved.
8. Conclusion
Efficient arrangements are good. Naked restraints to fix prices or
allocate markets are bad.
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APPENDIX B
Below are summary comparisons between the 1977 Guide and the 1988
Guidelines and predicted results under hypothetical circumstances. Under each
topic heading is a brief description of facts which both sets of guidelines use as a
starting point.
1. Acquisitions of Foreign Firms
Acquisition of foreign manufacturer by U.S. manufacturer of the same product.
Foreign manufacturer's export sales to the U.S. are non-existent or insignificant.
Case
Case 3: Foreign firm does
not currently sell the
product in the U.S. would
take foreign firm at least 18
months to begin selling in
the U.S.
Case 4: Merger of the two
most significant foreign
producers of product X
accounting for
approximately 60% of all X
consumed in the U.S.
Neither of the merging
firms' U.S. assets are used
to produce or sell X.
Case B: Foreign firm's
current export sales to U.S.
are "insignificant." Foreign
firm's product is "arguably
superior" to the
"traditional" product
offered by the U.S. firm.
Outcome
Necessary condition for
anticompetitive effect is that
foreign firm "actually would
enter the U.S. market
independenty... but for
this merger."
Department would not
challenge merger,
notwithstanding any
possible anticompetitive
effect, due to difficulty of
obtaining effective relief.
Merger may still be subject
to Hart-Scott-Rodino
Premerger Notification
Requirements.
Necessary conditions for
challenge are that foreign
firm have incentives to enter
and capability of entering
(or threatening to enter)
U.S. market.
1988 Guidelines:
1977 Guidelines:
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2. Joint Bidding
Establishment of consortium of several U.S. manufacturers and engineering
firms for purpose of bidding on a large hydroelectric project in a foreign
country.
Case
Case 5: Foreign country to
finance entire project
through a 30-year loan from
the U.S. Government
1977 Guidelines: Case C: No mention of
financing by U.S.
Government.
Outcome
Possible harm to U.S.
taxpayers supports assertion
ofjurisdiction. Apply rule-
of-reason analysis.
Department would not
challenge solely on basis of
competitive effects in
foreign market.
Consider possible
foreclosure of export
opportunities for U.S. firms.
Government challenge
solely on basis of
competitive effects in
foreign market.
1988 Guidelines:
Vol 23
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3. Joint Ventures
Formation of R&Djoint venture by large U.S. producer(s) and one of the largest
EEC producers of X-metal to develop new metal. U.S. producer(s) to receive
exclusive license in North America to all resulting patent rights and know-how,
and EEC producer to receive same license in EEC and certain other countries.
Case
1988 Guidlines: Case 6: Joint venture
includes three of the largest
U.S. producers, which
collectively supply 50% of
U.S. consumption of X-
metal. EEC producer agrees
not to sell in North America
any X-metal produced using
the licensed technology.
1977 Guidelines: Case D: Joint venture
includes only one U.S.
producer-the second
largest of five producers of
X-mental in the U.S.
[Agreement does not
restrict exports of X-metal
to North America.]
Case E: Formation of
manufacturing joint venture
by third largest U.S.
manufacturer of certain
transisitor parts and by one
ofJapan's largest industrial
combines. Neither Japanese
combine nor joint venture
may export transistors to
U.S. market.
Outcome
Apply rule-of-reason
analysis. Territorial
coordination may be
necessary to prevent
dissipation of value of R&D
due to competition in X-
metal product market.
Focus carefully on territorial
division created by exclusive
patent rights. Parties'
enforcement of process
patent rights only would not
result in territorial division
in X-metal product market.
Department would likely
challenge the "open-ended
restraint" on exporting
transistors to the U.S. since
restraint motivated by U.S.
firm's concern over cost-
cutting by joint venture.
Only a short-term ancillary
territorial restraint would
seem appropriate.
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4. Exclusive Distributorships
Mutual appointment by U.S. and German manufacturer of machine tools of each
other as their exclusive distributors in North America and the EEC, respectively.
Some of their products are directly interchangeable in use, but most are either
complementary or have significantly different special features.
Case
Case 7: Manufacturers are
"significant, but not
dominant," in their
respective countries.
Case 8: Same as Case 7
except that U.S.
manufacturer and German
manufacturer appoint the
same independent firms as
their exclusive distributor in
the U.S. The distributor
agrees to distribute only
machine tools supplied by
these two manufacturers.
Case]: Manufacturers are
"substantial, but not
dominant," in their
respective countries.
Outcome
Apply rule-of-reason
analysis. Do not treat as per
se unlawful market
allocation because
arrangement involves
economic integration and
largely complimentary
product lines, and is open
and notorious.
Apply rule-of-reason
analysis. Exclusive
distributorship "ordinarily"
raises no antitrust concern.
This particular arrangement
poses no significant risk of
collusion because both the
manufacturing and
distribution markets are
unconcentrated.
Apply per se rule against
territorial allocations among
competitors since parties are
both "substantial"
manufacturers, and
exclusive distributorship
provisions cover products as
to which manufactuerers
compete.
5. Multinational Operations
Assignment of territories by large, U.S.-based mu
subsidiaries that sell throughout much of the world.
Case
1988 Guidelines: Case 9 Pa
sul
pa
50
co
of
an
1977 Guidelines: Case A Pa
all
pr
wh
of
Itinational corporation to
Outcome
rent Corporation and any
bsidiary of which the
rent owns more thatn
76 of the voting stock are
nsidered legally incapable
conspiring with one
other within meaning of
I of Sherman Act.
rent corporation may
ocate territories or set
ices for subsidiaries for
ich it controls a majority
the voting stock.
1988 Guidelines:
1977 Guidelines:
Vol. 23
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6. Licenses with Grantbacks
Licensing of foreign firm by U.S. firm to practice certain patents in foreign firm's
country. Foreign firm is required to grant back to U.S. firm rights to practice
certain new patents that foreign firm may develop that are related to the licensed
technology.
1988 Guidelines:
1977 Guidelines
Case
Case 11: U.S. firm and
Japanese firm mutually
grant each other exdusive
rights to practice patents. If
either firm makes "patented
improvements" on the
other's technology, it will
assign the other firm rights
to practice the
improvements in its home
country. Patents involved
are process patents used in
manfacturing X.
Case I: U.S. firm licenses
three foreign firms: a
subsidiary in which it has
85%o of the voting stock, a
firm in which it has 30%o of
the voting stock, and a
leading local firm. Each
licensee required to grant
back tide or exclusive
license on any new patents
or knowhow it may develop
"related to the licensed
technology rights."
Outcome
Apply rule-of-reason
analysis. Effect in
technology market
considered same as outright
acquisition by U.S. firm of
Japanese firm's technology.
Effect in market for X
unlikely to be
anticompetitive if merger of
firms would fall within "safe
harbor." Grantback feature
can be procompetitive,
especially if nonexclusive,
by protecting patentee's
interest in its own
technology.
Breadth of grantback
obligations likely to be
challenged if foreign firm
"could in any way be
regarded" as an actual or
significant potential
competitor in the U.S.
Grantback obligations
limited to improvement
patents would be less likely
to be anticompetitive. Firms
in which U.S. firm has
effective control through
ownership of voting stock
are not considered actual or
potential competitors.
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7. Know-How Licenses
Twenty-year "technology transfer agreement" or "know-how license" between
small U.S. corporation with valuable unpatented technology (or know-how) and
foreign firm. U.S. corporation will convey technology or know-how used to
produce certain products to foreign firm, which is bound not to sell (a) certain
product(s) in the U.S.
Case
Case 12: U.S. corporation's
know-how is used to
produce product X. For the
duration of the "technology
transfer agreement," foreign
firm may not sell X in the
U.S., whether or not
manufactured using the
transferred technology.
1977 Guidelines: Case F: For the duration of
"know-how license," foreign
firm will not compete with
U.S. corporation, in the
U.S., in any product for
which the licensed
technology is used in the
manufacturing process. In
executing the process, the
foreign firm will use only
components provided by the
U.S. corporation.
Outcome
Apply rule-of-reason
analysis. Unlikely to find
anticompetitive effect in
relevant technology market,
or in relevant market for X,
unless some indication that
foreign firm would sell X in
the U.S. even without access
to U.S. corporation's
technology. Enabling U.S.
corporation to exploit
technology in foreign
markets stimulates
production of technology
that ultimately benefits U.S.
consumers.
Department would likely
challenge territorial
restriction if 20-year period
exceeded time needed for
reverse-engineering of the
technology ("unless the
parties could justify it as
necessary to the...
agreement"). Tie-in
unlikely to be challenged
unless it forecloses other
U.S. sources of the
components.
1988 Guidlines:
Vol. 23
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8. International Cartels and Boycotts
Formation of cartel by five or six foreign X-ore producers that agree on quotas
and prices for all X-ore production. Foreign government urges large U.S.
multinational corporation that mines X-ore abroad and processes it into X-
product to abide by cartel's quotas and prices.
Case
1988 Guidelines: Case 14: Quotas and prices
are set at a secret meeting.
More than 25% of world X-
ore production is consumed
in, the U.S.
1977 Guidelines: Case L: [No mention of
secret meeting.] Foreign
brokers resell about 25% of
world X-ore production in
the U.S.
Case K: U.S. oil company
complies with decree of
foreign government
prohibiting oil companies
operating in the country
from selling country's oil to
a particular U.S. refiner.
Outcome
Department would likely
prosecute agreement as a
naked agreement to fix price
and quantity, although
particular defendants may
be protected by foreign
sovereign immunity, foreign
sovereign compulsion, or
considerations of comity.
U.S. corporation not being
compelled, so not protected
by foreign sovereign
compulsion.
Agreement would dearly
violate U.S. antitrust laws
"unless defenses peculiar to
the international situation
apply to particular
defendants." U.S.
corporation may have a
defense under act of state
or foreign compulsion
doctrines.
Appears to be an illegal
boycott by oil companies,
each of which only deals
directly with the foreign
government. Company co-
conspirators not shielded by
sovereign immunity, and
since conduct is within U.S.
territory, act of state and
sovereign compulsion
defenses not available
either.
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9. Foreign Trade Restraints
Joint advice by producers of X in foreign country, including wholly-owned
subsidary of U.S. company, to the country's government favoring imposition of
a trade restraint.
Case
Case 15: Foreign
government issues an order
limiting amount of X that
may be exported to the U.S.
and allocating export quota
among the county's
producers.
Case 16: Voluntary export
restraint ("VER"). In
response to trade concerns
expressed by U.S.
Government, foreign
country's Minister of Trade
persuades each of the
country's five producers of
X to agree to reduce
exports to the U.S. by 10%.
Case N: Producers of X, in
advising foreign
government, suggest either
a tariff increase or an
embargo, either of which
would affect exports to the
country by a U.S.
manufacturer.
1988 Guidelines:
1977 Guidelines:
Outcome
Collective petitioning of
foreign government by
competitors is protected
under Noerr-Pennington
doctrine. Compliance with
order would likely be
protected under foreign
sovereign compulsion.
For reasons of comity,
Department would likely not
challenge.
Collective activity to cause
foreign government to
impose restraints on U.S.
commerce is protected
under Noerr-Pennington
doctrine. Foreign
government's imposition of
tariffs and quotas is
protected under act of state
doctrine.
Pol. 23440
